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To investigate such questions, we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment based on the Monty Hall problem, one of the most persistent and best documented examples of irrational behavior. Using methods adapted from earlier studies, we first verify the presence of erroneous beliefs and choices. Next we engineer a specific financial asset that embeds the Monty Hall problem, and require individual subjects to value this asset. Finally, we repeat the initial test for the existence of the Monty Hall 1 After the 1987 stock market crash, the government commissioned a presidential task force (the Brady Commission) to investigate causes of the crash, and to recommend measures to reduce the likelihood of future crashes. Although portfolio insurance was not the only cause of the crash, it was identified as a contributing factor (Fabozzi and Modigliani (2003), p. 269-270). error. We do not conduct an actual market, so subjects can't learn from competitive prices or from observation of others' trading behavior. Nevertheless, by the end of the experiment, most subjects have learned to avoid the error. Indeed, to our knowledge, our final Monty Hall error rate is lower than in any other previous individual learning environment. We conclude that the mere act of valuing an appropriately engineered asset can be a powerful learning experience.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant previous research, and Section 3 presents the experimental design. The experimental results are reported in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes. Appendix A includes the instructions to subjects.
Background
Financial engineering and behavioral finance are two of the most currently popular topics in Finance, but there is not much prior research linking the two. The most relevant previous studies are concerned separately with the Monty Hall problem and with framing effects in market experiments. We begin with the former topic.
The Monty Hall problem
The Monty Hall problem is a stylized version of a game from the classic TV show "Let's Make A Deal." Game show host Monty Hall asks a contestant to choose one of three doors. One of these doors conceals a valuable prize such as a new car while the other two doors conceal worthless prizes. After the contestant picks a door, Monty always opens one of the remaining doors and reveals one of the worthless prizes. Then
Monty gives the contestant a chance to switch doors, that is, to choose the remaining door. The probability that the valuable prize is behind the original door is one-third, so switching to the remaining door has a two-thirds probability of winning. Thus the rational strategy is to switch. The contestant, however, refuses to switch in the belief that his strategy will win with probability (at least) one-half. 2 The Monty Hall problem has been extensively studied in the laboratory, and the error is very common and very persistent. Indeed, even after having the error explained, many people cling to the belief that winning is equally likely whether or not the contestant switches. Such people include several professors, including a mathematician (e.g., Haddon, 2003, p61-65) . Friedman (1998) finds an initial error rate of almost 90%, and even in his most intense learning environments the error rate seldom drops much below 50%; the overall error rate was about 70%. Page (1998) finds that even subjects trained in a rather transparent version (with hundred doors) typically revert to the error in the standard three door version. Slembeck and Tyran (2002) and Palacios-Huerta (2003) show that social learning (e.g., with group decisions) can be effective in overcoming the error, but confirm that the error persists in individual learning environments. Kluger and Wyatt (2004) embed the Monty Hall problem into a financial asset in order to study whether the Monty Hall error aggregates into market prices. The asset features a conversion option that corresponds to switching doors. They find that asset prices do not reflect the Monty Hall error in sessions where two or more subjects are identified as understanding the problem based on their performance in the individual experiments. However, in cases where there aren't two subjects who understand the Monty Hall problem, prices do reflect the probability judgment error. The convertible asset design alone did not noticeably reduce the error.
2 Friedman (1998) notes some gaps between this stylized version and the actual game show.
Framing in markets
Framing effects refer to the possibility that alternative ways of posing an identical problem may affect agents' choices. Several sorts of framing effects are welldocumented in individual choice experiments (See Camerer, (1995) for a review).
Financial engineering involves the creation of new financial assets from existing assets.
As such, it can present investors with a re-framed version of the underlying decision problem, and may lead to different valuations.
Two prior studies examine framing in experimental asset markets. Kirchler, Maciejovsky and Weber (2004) study an asset market where the end of period payoff on the traded asset has a normal distribution with announced mean and variance. Positively framed subjects are also given the redundant information that there is a five percent chance that the next payoff will be higher than the corresponding .95 value, while negatively framed subjects are told that there is a five percent chance the next payoff will be lower than the corresponding .05 value. The authors report that positively framed subjects are more likely to be buyers and negatively framed subjects are more often sellers. Prices, however, are unaffected.
Weber, Keppe and Meyer-Delius (2000) study framing in an experimental asset market with a risky asset whose payoff depends on a drawing from an urn containing yellow and white balls. In positive frame treatments, some subjects are endowed with cash and shares of a white asset (W), which pays 100 if a white ball is drawn from the urn at the end of the period (and zero otherwise). In negative frame treatments, these subjects begin with a short position in yellow assets (Y), which pay 100 only if a yellow ball is drawn. Since a portfolio of one white share and one yellow share pays 100 for sure (W + Y = 100), a share of one asset is equivalent to cash and a short position in the other asset (W = 100 -Y). Negatively framed endowments substitute 100 -Y for each white share in the corresponding positively framed endowment. Although Weber, Keppe and MeyerDelius use the term "endowment frame," they are clearly practicing financial engineering when changing from the positive frame (endowments with only long positions) to the negative frame (endowment containing a short position). The authors report higher asset prices in the negative endowment frame; subjects with short positions were willing to pay a higher price to buy assets to cover their short positions. Evidently subjects are not always maximizing expected utility, but the design can not tell us whether the divergence from rationality is occurring in the positive frame, the negative frame, or both.
Experimental design
We conducted an individual choice experiment with 40 subjects recruited from the undergraduate population at the University of California at Santa Cruz. Each of the five sessions lasted approximately ninety minutes, including instructions, with average payouts of about twenty dollars per subject, paid in cash at the end of the session. **Table 1** Table 1 presents the experimental design. Each session consists of five separate blocks, with each block containing one to sixteen periods of a given task. There are two types of tasks, choice tasks and valuation tasks, which we now describe.
Choice task
Our choice task is a modified version of the Monty Hall problem. As in Friedman (1998) and subsequent laboratory studies, each period the subjects see three ordinary playing cards, placed face-down on a mat. They are informed that two of the cards are red (hearts or diamonds), and one is black (clubs or spades). One of the subjects (selected on a rotating basis) chooses one of three face-down cards to be the set-aside card, and the card is moved to the marked position on the mat. Then, the person conducting the experiment looks privately at the two remaining cards, and always reveals one of them to be a red card. Finally, subjects are asked to choose either the set-aside card, or the remaining card. All subjects privately mark their choice on a form. After collecting the form, the conductor turns over both of the face-down cards. If a subject correctly chose the black card, he or she earns sixty cents. If incorrect, the subject earns nothing. The sequence of events for a choice task period is presented in Figure 1 . **Figure 1** Choosing the remaining card in this choice task corresponds to switching doors in the Monty Hall problem. The remaining card has a two-thirds probability of winning, while the set-aside card has only a one-third chance of winning. Therefore, a subject who correctly assesses the probabilities should always choose the remaining card. The common judgment error is to believe that each card is equally likely to win. Subjects with this erroneous belief would regard all choices as having the same expected payoff, and so might indulge in any choice pattern.
Valuation task
The valuation task alters the Monty Hall problem, no longer requiring subjects to choose between the set-aside and the remaining card, but instead requiring subjects to value the remaining card. We use a choice menu procedure that can be regarded as a simplified version of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) procedure for eliciting subjects' valuations. The task has three variants, which we call R (revealed), U (unrevealed) and U+R (both).
At the start of each R period, each subject is given one share of an asset that pays the bearer sixty cents if the remaining card that period is black and pays nothing otherwise. As in the choice task just described, three cards are placed face-down on the mat, one of the subjects chooses the set-aside card, and the conductor reveals a red remaining card. Each subject is then given the chance to sell his or her share. The set of possible prices is 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41 or 43 cents, with the actual price determined by a random drawing from a bingo cage. Subjects fill out a form asking them to choose whether or not to sell their share at each of the possible prices. The random drawing then determines the share price for the period. Finally, as before, the face-down cards are turned over. Subjects who chose to sell at the price drawn receive that amount.
Subjects who decided to keep the share will receive sixty cents only if the remaining card is black.
If a subject correctly assesses the probabilities, then the expected value of the share is forty cents; it is the sixty cent payoff if the remaining card is black times the twothirds probability of that event. An incorrect belief that the black card is equally likely to be either the set-aside card or the remaining card leads to the incorrect expected value of thirty cents.
The U (unrevealed) periods are identical to the R periods, except that both remaining cards stay face-down until the last step; U periods skip the step where the conductor reveals a red set aside card. Of course, skipping this step has no effect on the true valuation of the share, because revealing a red card is always feasible whether or not one of the remaining cards is black.
The U+R (both) periods require the subjects to value the shares twice. Exactly as in the other periods, one of the subjects chooses the set-aside card. Subjects then value their shares by circling either "keep" or "sell" at each of the possible prices. Next, one of the remaining cards is turned over, always revealing a red card. Subjects again value their shares by circling "keep" or "sell", but on a second form. However, only one of the forms will count. A subject spins a six-sided die to determine whether the earlier form (a roll of 1, 2 or 3) or the later form (4, 5, or 6) will be active. Finally the price is determined according to a bingo drawing. Subjects who circled sell at that price on the active form will then sell their share.
The sequences of events for the R, U, and U+R periods are diagrammed in 
Results
The results for each block of the experiment are presented in sequence. We will see that the Monty hall error is prevalent in the beginning, but declines considerably by the end of the session. We focus on when in the intermediate blocks most of the subjects learn to behave optimally.
Initial choice task
In Block A, subjects chose either the set-aside card, or the remaining card. The remaining card is the optimal choice, giving the subject twice the chance of picking the black card and earning the sixty cent payoff. The results are presented in Table 2 . **Table 2** R% represents the percentage of the time (out of eight periods) that a subject chose the remaining card, the optimal choice. Across all subjects, the average R% was 58%, significantly higher than in some previous studies. (Possible reasons are discussed in section 4.4 below). There are no obvious time trends within Block A; by period the average R% were 67.5%, 52.5%, 37.5%, 53.5%, 52.5%, 80%, 60%, and 65%. Seven of the forty subjects picked the remaining card every time (R% = 100%).
3 Three subjects had an R% of zero. The remaining thirty subjects sometimes chose the set-aside card, and other times chose the remaining card. Table 2 includes a chi-square goodness-of-fit test of the null hypothesis that R% follows a binomial distribution (with p = 50%); i.e., that subjects are equally likely to make either choice each period. The test rejects the null hypothesis at a significance level of .001. The reason is that both tails, R% = 100% and R% =0, occur far too often in the sample. However, if the tails are dropped, i.e., we exclude the subjects who always choose remaining and who always choose set-aside, then the p-value becomes .14, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis. That is, many of the subjects appear to choose randomly in the first block. cents. For extreme choices the value is conservatively assigned to be a penny past the endpoint. Thus if the subject sold at every price, his or her value is between zero and 27 cents, and we assigned the value of 26 cents. Likewise, a subject who kept at every price is assigned the value of 44 cents.
Valuation tasks
* Table 3 ** Recall that the rational expected value is 40 cents and that the Monty Hall error implies an expected value of 30 cents. In U periods, the error should not arise because both of the remaining cards are face-down. Table 3 shows that indeed the average valuation for the U periods in Block B is 39.50 cents, very close to the expected value of forty cents. The table also reports the results of two Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. The "L40" tests the null hypothesis that the subject's valuation is forty against the one-sided alternative hypothesis that the subject's valuation is less than forty. The null hypothesis is rejected at a p-value of .05 in U periods for only ten of the forty subjects. The "G30"
tests the null that the subject's valuation is thirty against the one-sided alternative hypothesis that the subject's valuation is greater than thirty. For the U periods, the null is rejected for 39 of 40 subjects at a p-value of .05. Thus all evidence indicates that subjects value shares correctly in U periods of Block B.
In the R periods, some subjects are making the Monty Hall error, but others are not. The average valuation is 37.68 cents. The rational null hypothesis in the "L40" test is rejected for one-half of the subjects in the direction of the Monty Hall error. However, the irrational null hypothesis in the "G30" test is rejected for 35 of 40 subjects in the rational direction. Apparently the error is present in Block B but in diluted form.
** Table 4 Table 4 shows that the null hypothesis is rejected using either the paired t-test, or the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Once again we conclude that the Monty Hall error is present in this block, at least to some degree. **Table 5**
In the next Block, each subject's valuation was elicited twice per period, both before and after one of the remaining cards was revealed to be red. Table 5 shows that the averages are almost the same: 39.36 cents before, and 39.57 after. The averages are very close to forty, the true expected payoff value. The rational L40 null hypothesis is rejected for 16 subjects in the before data and for 13 in the after data, fewer than in the R periods of Block B but more often than in the U periods. 4 Overall, there is less evidence of the Monty Hall error in Block C. Indeed, the irrational G30 null hypothesis that the asset value equals 30 is rejected for thirty-eight of forty subjects before, and thirty-nine of forty after, the remaining card is revealed to be red. Virtually all subjects have learned that the shares are worth more than thirty. ** Table 6 **
The experimental design permits another diagnostic test in Block C, comparing each subject's before and after valuations. Table 6 shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis using either the paired-t or the Wilcoxon test. In conjunction with the result that average valuations are near forty, as well as the L40 and G30 results, this result confirms that the incidence of the Monty Hall error has declined further by Block C.
Solving the Monty Hall problem
In Block D, subjects return to the choice task of choosing either the remaining or the set-aside card. Table 7 shows that eight subjects are now choosing the remaining card every time (R% = 100%), and only one subject is choosing the set-aside every time (R% = 0). The average R% has increased to 72%, well above the 58% rate in Block A. The binomial null hypothesis, that subjects are randomly choosing set-aside and remaining with equal likelihood, is now rejected, even when the R% = 0 and R% = 100% extremists are excluded. ** Table 7 Figure 3 . Subjects above the forty-five degree line in Figure 3 chose the remaining card more often in Block D than they did in Block A.
Twenty-five subjects are in this category. Seven subjects had the same R% in Block D and Block A, and only eight subjects had a lower R% in Block D than they did in Block A. Statistical tests confirm the increase in R%. The null hypothesis that R% is the same is rejected with p < .01 using either a paired t-test or a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
Finally, Block E consists of a single period of the choice task, identical to earlier choice task periods except that the payoff for correctly choosing the black card is multiplied by ten. Almost 78% of the subjects chose the remaining card in Block E. The incidence of the Monty Hall error is significantly diminished by the end of the session.
5 Table 8 also addresses the crucial question of exactly when subjects are learning to avoid the Monty Hall error. It contains the R% by subject for the choice task blocks, as well as both the initial and final period valuations by subject for the valuation task blocks. By the end of Block B, the average valuation is already 39.15, very close to the correct expected value of forty. Statistical tests of the null hypotheses that the valuation is increasing during/across blocks are reported in Table 9 . **Table 9** There is a statistically significant increase in valuation from the start of Block B to the end of Block B, but no subsequent significant increase. It seems that the majority of subjects who learn to solve the Monty Hall problem tend to do so in Block B.
Designating the set-aside card
The choice of the initial card may represent an important difference between our laboratory tasks and those of many other Monty Hall studies. For example, Friedman (1998) has each subject personally choose a card, and then decide later whether or not to switch. In our experiment only one subject (of 4 to 11 subjects in our sessions) picks a card each period, and the card is given the rather neutral label "set-aside." Subjects are not told that the initial card is theirs, nor do they have the opportunity to switch per se. It is possible that these differences in how the Monty Hall problem is presented are responsible for our lower initial error rate. Our procedures may reduce the force of regret avoidance, illusion of control and/or status quo bias (Camerer, 1995 Tables 10 and 11 respectively summarize subjects' choices and valuations, according to whether or not they designated the setaside card. Table 10 reports a Fisher's exact test of the null hypothesis that the designators' likelihood of choosing the remaining card is the same as the nondesignators.' The null hypothesis is never rejected. We do not detect any difference between designators' and non-designators' choices in any of the choice blocks. Table 11 reports a paired t-test comparing individual subjects' valuations when they designated to their valuations when they did not designate the set-aside card. We find a small (less than a penny) but statistically significant difference in the before treatment in Block C. We detect no difference in the other three comparisons.
6 Illusion of control refers to a subject's belief that his or her actions somehow influence random events. Status quo bias refers to an endowment effect where a subject will prefer (all else the same) his or her current choice simply because he or she already has it. See Slembeck (2001) for additional discussion of the relevance of these biases to the Monty Hall decision error.
Summary
Subjects in our experiment learn to overcome the Monty Hall error, and the key learning experience appears to be practice in valuing an engineered financial asset.
Before this learning experience, subjects in the Monty Hall task made the irrational choice (the "set-aside" card) 42% of the time overall, and we saw no evidence of improvement from period to period. After the learning experience, the irrational choice rate fell to 28% overall and 22% in final choices. Of the 40 subjects, 13 made the black. This more complex asset is equivalent to ours in terms of the uncertainty space spanned, and trading it helped to aggregate information. However, it did not noticeably reduce individuals' tendency to commit the Monty Hall error. We conclude that appropriate financial engineering can promote learning, above and beyond its ability to provide a wider span of securities at lower price.
Although our experiment shows that a particular asset design lowers the Monty
Hall error rate, it does not explain why this design is effective. We only observe subjects' choices and valuations, not their reasoning. Nonetheless, the evidence is consistent with the following explanation. While all cards are still face-down, the majority of subjects probably believe that there is a one-third chance that the set-aside card is black. Subjects who are prone to the error likely believe that when the red card is revealed, there is an equal chance of either the remaining or set-aside card being black.
Subjects who make this error therefore mistakenly believe that revealing the red card affects the chance that the set-aside card is black. We conjecture that designing the asset to pay based on the color of the remaining card makes it easier to see that revealing a red card has no effect on the probability. Once subjects realize this, they can correctly value the experimental asset. The convertible asset does not appear to encourage the same learning process.
Of course, the connection between financial engineering and learning may be a two-way street. If breaking down or combining assets to create new ones can promote rationality, the reverse must also be true. Recombining assets can also potentially promote irrationality. Our results suggest that in at least some settings financial engineering can help foster individual rationality. Whether or not financial engineering has a similar effect in other laboratory or field financial markets requires further study.
But it no longer seems safe to assume that financial engineering has no effect on market biases.
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TABLE 1 Experimental Design
A session of the experiment consists of five blocks, with each block consisting of one or more periods. The choice-task periods required subjects to choose between the set-aside card and the remaining card. The valuation-task periods required subjects to value the remaining card(s) using a simplified version of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak method. 
Panel B
Chi-Square goodness-of-fit tests for the sample following a binomial distribution.
Prob
H O Subjects ARE choosing remaining or set-aside randomly with equal probability.
H A Subjects ARE NOT choosing remaining or set-aside randomly with equal probability. H A Subjects ARE NOT choosing remaining or set-aside randomly with equal probability.
.14

TABLE 3 Average Valuations by Subject in Block B
Valuations are equal to the midpoint of the interval on the valuation forms, except for the endpoints, which are 26 (low) and 44 (high). In R periods, one of the remaining cards was revealed to be red prior to valuation. In U periods, both remaining cards were face-down. The L40 column reports a Wilcoxon signed-rank test that the subject's valuation equals 40, against the alternative that the valuation is less than 40. G30 tests the null that the subject's valuation is 30 against the alternative that the valuation is greater than 30. One asterisk (or two) rejects the null at p = .05 (or p = .01). 
R Periods
TABLE 5 Average Valuations by Subject in Block C
Valuations are equal to the midpoint of the interval on the valuation forms, except for the endpoints, which are 26 (low) and 44 (high). Valuations were elicited first before, and then after, one of the remaining cards was revealed. The L40 column reports a Wilcoxon signed-rank test that the subject's valuation equals 40, against the alternative that the valuation is less than 40. G30 tests the null that the subject's valuation is 30 against the alternative that the valuation is greater than 30. One asterisk (or two) rejects the null at p = .05 (or p = .01). 
After
Panel B
Prob
H A Subjects ARE NOT choosing remaining or set-aside randomly with equal probability. H A Subjects ARE NOT choosing remaining or set-aside randomly with equal probability. 77.9 <.001
TABLE 8 Responses by Block
R% is the average rate (out of eight periods) of a subject choosing the remaining card. Block B valuations are for the R periods only (when one of the remaining cards is revealed to be red). Block C valuations are the after (the red remaining card is revealed) valuations. Block E is a single period of the choice task. "Yes" signifies that the subject chose the remaining card. "No" signifies he or she chose the set-aside card. 
Block
FIGURE 1 The Sequence of Events for a Period of the Choice Task
Three ordinary playing cards are placed face-down on a mat with positions labeled 1, 2, and 3. Two of the cards are red (diamonds or hearts), and one is black (club or spade). One subject (a volunteer) chooses one of the cards, which is then designated as the set-aside card. The other two cards are designated as the remaining cards.
The conductor looks at the two remaining cards and reveals one of them. The revealed card is always a red card.
Each subject privately chooses either the set-aside card, or the remaining card. If the subject correctly chooses the black card, he or she wins sixty cents. If incorrect, the subject does not earn anything this period.
Both the set-aside card and the remaining card are revealed.
FIGURE 2 The Sequence of Events for a Period of the Valuation Task
R Period
U Period U+R Period
Subjects can privately select prices at which they would be willing to sell their share (Simplified Becker-DeGroot-Marchak method).
Each subject receives a share of an experimental asset which pays sixty cents if either of the remaining cards is black, and zero otherwise.
The price is chosen, based on a drawing of possible prices from a bingo cage. If a subject was willing to sell at the selected price, then their sell order is executed.
Subjects again can privately select prices at which they would be willing to sell their share. A volunteer then rolls a six-sided die. If the result is 4 or more, then these valuations replace the earlier valuations.
Both the set-aside card and the remaining card are revealed. You are about to participate in an experiment in financial decision-making. If you follow these instructions carefully, and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money. Today's session will consist of three parts. Your overall earnings will be the total of your earnings in each part. At the end of the experiment, you will receive your overall earnings in cash.
This part of the experiment will consist of several separate periods. At the start of each period, three playing cards will be placed face down in random order in the 1, 2, and 3 spot on a mat. The face-down cards are ordinary playing cards. Two of the cards will be red (diamonds or hearts) and one of the cards will be black (clubs or spades). A volunteer will then choose a number: "1", "2", or "3". The number chosen will be used to designate a card as the "set-aside" card. For example, if the volunteer chooses "3", the mat would appear as: Figure 2 The next step will be to reveal one of the two remaining cards. We will not reveal the setaside card. The conductor will look at the other two remaining cards and always reveal a red card. Continuing the example in Figure 2 , the conductor will look at cards 1 and 2, and reveal one of them. The revealed card will always be a red card. Suppose the conductor turns over card 2. At this point, you will be asked to choose a card. Your goal will be to choose the black card. If you choose the black card, you will win 60 cents, but if you choose the red card, you will not win any money this period.
Subject ID Period
Your Guess for the Black Card:
Set Aside Card
Remaining Card Figure 4 Fill in the form by checking the appropriate box. If you check "set aside", then you will win 60 cents if the "set-aside" card is black, and nothing otherwise. If you check "remaining", then you will win 60 cents if the "set aside" card is red, and nothing otherwise. Continuing the example from Figure 3 , if you choose "set aside", you will win if card 3 is black. If you choose "remaining" you will win if card 1 is black.
The conductor will then collect the forms and reveal both of the cards. If you correctly chose the black card, your winnings will be added to your earnings for this part of the experiment.
Q: Is this some kind of psychology experiment with an agenda you haven't told us? A: No. It is an economics experiment. If we do anything deceptive, or don't pay you cash as described, then you can complain to the campus Human Subjects Committee and we will be in serious trouble. These instructions are on the level and our interest is in seeing how people make decisions in certain situations. The actual price is decided by a drawing from a bingo cage containing a distribution of balls, labeled 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41 and 43 . A volunteer will spin a bingo cage and randomly choose a ball. The number on the ball chosen will represent the price for this period.
Continuing the example, suppose the volunteer randomly selects a "41." Since you circled 41, you will sell your share for 41 cents. If instead a "27" was selected, you do not sell because you circled "Keep you share" if the price is 27 cents.
All cards are revealed and earnings are calculated.
The face-down cards are turned over. Each share of the asset will pay the bearer 60 cents if one of the remaining cards was black, and pays nothing if both were red.
If you sold your share, then your earnings for the period will simply be the sale price. For example, if you sold your share in step 5 for 41 cents, then your earnings for the period will be 41 cents, regardless of whether or not the remaining card(s) is black.
If you did not sell your share, then you will earn 60 cents for the period if the remaining card(s) is black and nothing if the set-aside card is black. If step 4 was not skipped, then there will only be one "remaining" card still face-down. If step 4 was skipped, there will be two remaining face-down cards. In this case, you will earn 60 cents if either of the two remaining cards is the black card.
After the cards are revealed, your share is liquidated, so it doesn't carry over to the next period. You will receive a new share at the start of the next period. Your earnings for the period will be added to your overall earnings, and the next period will start.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Frequently Asked Questions:
Q: Can I affect the share price? A: No. Remember that the share price is determined by a drawing from a bingo cage. The price you circle will not affect which ball is drawn from the cage. The prices you circle will only affect whether or not you will sell if one of those prices are chosen.
Q: Is it ever profitable to circle "sell" at a price that is lower than the amount I think the share is worth? A: No. Suppose your value for a share is 36 cents. If so, you should circle "keep your share" at 27, 29, 31, 33, or 35, and you should circle "sell your share" at 37, 39, 41 and 43 cents. Let's call this the original strategy. To see why this is best, consider an alternate strategy, where you make a single change. Now you select "sell your share" at 35 cents. If the price (determined by the bingo drawing is 27, 29, 31, or 33, you will keep your share regardless of whether you choose the original or the alternate strategy. Similarly, if the price is 37, 39, 41, or 43, you will sell you share regardless which strategy you choose. The only time there will be a difference is when the price is 35 cents. With the original strategy, you keep the share, but with the alternate strategy, you will sell. Keeping the share is better because if it is worth 36 to you, you would rather keep the share than sell it for 35 cents.
Q: Is it ever profitable to circle "sell" at a price that is higher than the amount I think the share is worth? A: No. A similar example will show you why. Suppose your value for a share is 36 cents. If so, you should circle "keep your share" at 27, 29, 31, 33, or 35, and you should circle "sell your share" at 37, 39, 41 and 43 cents. Let's call this the original strategy. Now, consider an alternate strategy where you now change your response to "keep your share" at 37 cents. The only time there will be a difference is when the price is 37 cents. With the original strategy, you sell the share, but with the alternate strategy, you will keep. Keeping the share is worse because if it is worth 36 to you, you would rather sell the share for 37 cents than keep it.
